How to bring Pakistan and Bangladesh closer in a confederation

I was in Dhaka the day we won the world cup in cricket. The excitement was all over the place. In the morning, I had to visit a government office to get some information, accompanied by an official guide. Office after office was closed.

“Is there a strike?” I wondered.

“No, the officers are at home watching the cricket match,” the guide explained.

Finally, he found an officer in his seat. “You have great sense of duty,” I complimented him on his presence. The officer, with a white beard, smiled. “Well, I have my son at home, calling me every hour to give the latest score.” There was widespread jubilation on the result, as if Bangladesh itself had won. Such were the emotions of the people.

After moving about for several days and meeting people, including public servants, it seemed that the people, if they could, would love to lift their country and place it next to Pakistan. Even after so many years, the separation and its aftermath had not diminished the deep Muslim brotherhood.

We can do now what we should have done back in 1971. We can create a framework that brings us closer and closer, overcoming the bitterness of the past. While retaining their separate identities, the two countries can unite in a confederation. Minimal in the beginning, the relations will grow gradually as trust and understanding increases.

How to do it? As the first step, Parliaments of the two countries should adopt the draft constitution given below to form “Pak Desh.” It provides only a framework for bringing the two countries closer in their mutual interest, without imposing any action that any side may consider undesirable, or interference in its internal affairs. It also does not propose any grandiose plan, such as a common currency or common Parliament.

The Constitution of Pak Desh

WHEREAS the people of Pakistan and Bangladesh, having won Independence in 1947 as a single country, want to have as close relations as possible, while retaining their sovereignty and independence;

WHEREAS the people of both countries, being part of the Muslim Ummah, want to cooperate and collaborate in the promotion of Islam and closer relations with Muslims everywhere;

WHEREAS the two countries have common interests and objectives and want to work together to achieve them;

NOW, THEREFORE, they hereby adopt this Constitution, through their representatives in Parliaments of Pakistan and Bangladesh, and it will take effect from _____.

1. Pakistan and Bangladesh will form a confederation, to be called “Pak Desh.”

2.  Pakistan and Bangladesh will retain their names and independence as sovereign countries.

3. Pakistan and Bangladesh will be called henceforth respectively Western and Eastern Wings of Pak Desh with regard to affairs of the Confederation.

4.     President The head of Pak Desh will be Pak Desh President.

5.     On the recommendation of Parliament of either Wing, Parliaments of both Wings will elect as the Pak Desh President a person, who qualifies to be elected the President of his Wing, with votes of more than 50 percent of the total members of each Parliament.

6.  Pak Desh President will continue in office without an limit of age until he resigns, is declared unfit mentally and physically or Parliament of either Wing shows lack of confidence in him with a vote of more than 50 percent of its total members.

7.  Pak Desh President will be provided official residence in the Wing of his domicile. When visiting the other Wing, he will stay in the President House or

8.  Council Pak Desh will have a Council, to be called Pak Desh Council, consisting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Interior of Governments of both Wings.

9.   While discussing an matter that is not under the jurisdiction of any of the Council Members, the relevant Ministers of both Wings will be invited to participate in discussion and decision.

10.  Pak Desh President will preside over the meetings of the Pak Desh Council.

11. The Council will meet at least once in every 90 days.

12.  The Council will take all decisions with consensus of its members.

13.  Every decision of the Council will take effect in both Wings after 90 days unless Parliament of either Wing overrules it or fails to pass relevant legislation within the given period.

14.  If Parliament of a Wing modifies a decision of the Council before the end of 90 days, the modification will take effect after the approval of Parliament of the other Wing.

15.  Secretariat a) The Secretariat of Pak Desh will have a setup each in Islamabad and Dhaka.

b) The Secretariat staff will consist entirely of employees provided on deputation by the Government of the relevant Wing.

c) The staff, subject to the rules of their Government, will retain lien with their parent departments to get promotion, when due, and other benefits.

16. The Governments of the two Wings will approve the budget of Pak Desh, with each Government bearing half of the total budget expenditure.

17.  The official languages of the Secretariat will be Urdu and Bangla.

18.  Every staff member of the Secretariat will be required to be very fluent in both languages, so that he can read, write and speak in either language without difficulty.

19.  Islam Both Wings will cooperate and collaborate in the promotion of Islam through all possible means and in having closer relations with Muslims everywhere.

20.   The embassies and diplomatic missions of the two Wings will collaborate to improve relations of Pak Desh with Muslim countries.

21.   Foreign policy Both Wings will consult each other regularly on foreign policy matters and their embassies and diplomatic missions will collaborate on matters of common interest.

22.   Visa Each Wing will set up visa offices in major cities of the other Wing.

23.   Visa offices will receive applications for visas directly through registered post. Interviews will not be required for tourist and business visas.

24.   The visitors from one Wing to the other Wing will not have to report their arrival and departure at a police station. On arrival and departure, a visitor will submit only a report card at immigration counter.

25.   Defense The military attack on a Wing will be considered an attack on the other Wing also and both will fight against the aggressor with all available means, including nuclear weapons.

26.  Both Wings will cooperate and collaborate in defense matters, including training, equipment supply and joint military exercises.

27.  Commerce The trade between the two Wings will be considered internal, subject only to essential regulations of the relevant Government.

28.  A private or public limited company in either Wing will be allowed to set up an office or factory in the other Wing after informing the central bank of the Wing, without requiring formal permission.

29.  There will be no duties or taxes on the items traded between the two Wings, if grown, produced or manufactured locally. 

30.  Buyers in a Wing will pay in their own currency for imports from the other Wing.

31.  The currency of a Wing will be converted into the currency of the other Wing only through scheduled banks and at a rate determined daily by the central bank of the respective Wing.

32.  Communication The Governments of the two Wings will set up jointly an undersea optic fiber link between them, share the initial cost and subsequent running expenses and offer its use free of charge to telecom companies of both Wings, provided they apply domestic rates to their customers for inter-Wing voice calls and other communications.

33.  Domestic postal rates will apply to the surface mail between the two Wings.

34.  Each Wing will subsidize by more than 50 percent the fares of the Lahore-Dhaka and Karachi-Dhaka flights of its national carrier.

35.  The two Wings will have joint regular shipping services for inter-Wing trade and passenger services.

36.   Both Wings will negotiate with India for transit of direct passenger and goods trains between them, running under Indian escorts.

37.   Education The public sector universities and other educational institutions in one Wing will admit students from the other Wing on merit, whether they get scholarships from their Government or want to study at their own expense.

38.  The Government of a Wing will promote the teaching of the national language of the other Wing in its educational institutions.

39.  Sports Both Wings will hold regular annual inter-Wing matches in cricket, hockey, football, athletics, and other sports.

40.   The best players of both Wings in a sport may form Pak Desh teams to play against teams of other countries.

41.  Culture Each Wing will set up cultural centers in the major cities of the other Wing to promote better understanding.

42.  The feature films produced in one Wing will be shown in the other Wing, whether in original language, dubbed or with subtitles, to provide larger markets to their film industries.

43.  Joint production of films will be encouraged with government subsidies.

44.  The state-owned and private television channels of both Wings will be encouraged to exchange content and to produce it jointly.

45.  The Government of both Wings will sponsor exchange visits of university teachers and students, journalists, writers, artists, etc.

46.  The newspapers and magazines of a Wing may print facsimile editions in the other Wing to promote better understanding of their Wing, provided that the facsimile editions will not include local advertisements and news to avoid conflict with local publications.

47.  Cooperation The two Wings will continue to explore possibilities of more cooperation and collaboration in all fields of common interest.

Some more questions about Husain Haqqani fiasco

Conspiracies are intriguing and fascinating. The Memo Scandal, involving Husain Haqqani and others, is no different. Some of its secrets are already known, while others may be on the way. In my previous post ( (see article below), I raised some questions. Here are some more.

Why was the memo written and delivered in the first place?

According to Mansoor Ijaz, Haqqani claimed that the government feared a military coup. However, now it appears that it was the other way round. After the Abbottabad attack, the army preferred to claim that it had been taken by surprise. In view of its vulnerability due to public outrage, somebody in the Zardari coterie had the brilliant idea that the present army leadership should be replaced with pliable one. The idea got a favorable hearing.

However, it was not forgotten what had happened to Nawaz Sharif, who made a clumsy attempt to remove the army chief with disastrous consequences. So, it was decided to get the American support before replacing top generals.

The thrust of the charge against Haqqani is given in Mansoor’s article in Newsweek (http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/12/04/an-insider-analysis-of-pakistan-s-memogate.html

). He writes,

“Zardari and Haqqani both knew the U.S. was going to launch a stealth mission to eliminate bin Laden that would violate Pakistan’s sovereignty. They may have even given advance consent after CIA operations on the ground in Pakistan pinpointed the Saudi fugitive’s location. The unilateral U.S. action, they might have surmised, would result in a nation blaming its armed forces and intelligence services for culpability in harboring bin Laden for so many years. They planned to use the Pakistani public’s hue and cry to force the resignations of Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and intelligence chief Gen. Shuja Pasha. Pliable replacements would have been appointed.”

Haqqani has not much to worry about a conviction if Zardari is still the President. After all, there will be nothing to stop Zardari from pardoning Haqqani promptly. If Rehman Malik can survive despite court judgments, there is no reason why Haqqani should fare worse.

Persons close to Zardari, in Islamabad and Washington, conceived, wrote and finished the memo, with his approval. Then it was delivered to the Pentagon through Mansoor.

Why did the memo surface now?

Both Haqqani and Ijaz would have kept the memo secret forever, whether or not it led to any action by the U.S. How come it was disclosed only after four months? Lt Gen Hameed Gul believes that the Pentagon made the disclosure after the government had failed to carry out the promises made in the memorandum even in over four months. (That means the Pentagon did give the warning to the army top brass that Zardari coterie wanted and then waited for the fulfillment of the promises in the memo.)

There is another possibility. The Pentagon did not expect a pliable government to emerge after the elections because parties of both Zardari and Nawaz Sharif were losing popularity. Imran Khan could break into vote banks of both PPP and Nawaz League. The more time he has, the more popularity he will gain. Even if he did not get majority in election, he could still end up as the head of a coalition. That will make life quite difficult for the U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

The urgent question for the Pentagon was: How to stop Imran Khan? The best option would be to get rid of the PPP government now, help install an interim government to revive economy and clear the mess, and get the elections postponed indefinitely. Then it will be comfortable army-to-army dealings. Since top Pentagon generals knew the existence of the Haqqani memo, one of them asked Ijaz to disclose it. It was to be a booby trap. No wonder, the Zardari regime is teetering on the verge of collapse.

Could Haqqani nip the scandal in the bed?

He could. The day Mansoor’s article appeared in The Financial Times, Haqqani could have concluded that Zardari’s game was up. The Pentagon did convey the warning to the army in May but was now angry with Zardari for failing to carry out the remaining promises in his memo.

That should have been enough for Haqqani to resign immediately, claiming that he was exhausted by grueling diplomacy and wanted to go back to his “professory” (as we say in Urdu). To be on the safe side, he could also seek political asylum. To his misfortune, Haqqani dragged his feet and finally had to leave Washington kicking and screaming to face the music in Islamabad.

As it happens often with ambitious persons, arrogance makes them ignore the ground realities. Haqqani was not willing to call it quits so easily. With Zardari at his back and many influential friends in the U.S., he was sure he could survive easily. However, his defense against Ijaz’s onslaught was only denial. It was like defending oneself with a plastic shield against a rocket launcher. So, he landed himself soon in a very hot soup, with his hope dashed of becoming the National Security Advisor and, with luck, even something much higher. Now he wonders whether it will be his neck or that of his “boss” -- or both.

What can Haqqani do now?

There was for some time a talk of compromise (muk muka مک مکا  in plain words), to end the episode after getting Haqqani’s resignation. However, the action by Supreme Court on the Haqqani scandal has made it impossible.

بات نکلی ھے تو دور تلک جاءے گی

Now Haqqani has two options: Stick with Zadari or betray him. If he believes that Zardari will survive the crisis, he may decide to remain faithful to him. If, in his view, Zardari may be forced out even without impeachment or conviction (see below), Haqqani may become an approver against his “boss.”

What are the prospects for Zardari’s survival? His impeachment may be difficult, as he may use all his skills and means to win over most MNAs. The motion to impeach Pervez Musharraf seemed likely to succeed, as it had support from both the U.S. and the army. If the same support is available, Zardari may be impeached. However, it will be simply removal as President. He will still be a force to reckon with, being the head of his party.

If Zardari is prosecuted, his prospects will be better than impeachment. He did not allow any case against him to reach a conclusion despite years of trial. He will work harder to do the same indefinitely, using all the tricks of legal profession.

Haqqani might be tried not under Article 6 of the Constitutionbut, according to Justice Tariq Mahmood, under Section 121 of the Pakistan Penal Code, viz., “Whoever wages war against Pakistan, or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.”

How will it all end?

A lot of noise may be created for months by investigation, court trial, impeachment motion, discussions, agitations, all the words poured out in the paper and electronic media but the process may well drag into Zardari’s final months in office. He is not very keen for another term for him and his party because he and his cronies have grabbed all they wanted, destroying all they could in the process. So, he will not be unhappy if he leaves in 2013 with a guard of honor.

However, what most people fear may well happen, as long as Zardari is in Sadar Mahal صدر محل (President House). In the meantime, he may do much worse than he had promised the U.S. in his memo to Admiral Mike Mullen. So, the Establishment may not be willing to allow status quo to continue. It also has to consider abysmal conditions in the country: economic disaster, massive corruption, gross misgovernance, high inflation, severe crime wave, energy crisis, political chaos, subservience to foreign interests. The security of the state and vital national interests are far more important than any possible hostile reaction from politicians, media and Supreme Court. (The U.S. and the so-called “international community” may soon reconcile with fait accompli, even if it is not happy.) So, don’t be surprised if you learn one fine morning that the 111 Brigade is in action.

Some questions on the Husain Haqqani fiasco

روشنی طبع، تو بر من بلا شدی اے

This Farsi line applies aptly to Husain Haqqani, now that his brilliance has landed him in the worst debacle of his career.

The fiasco raised many questions, some still unanswered, some not fully answered. Let us try to find out what it was all about and also put available facts in perspective.

Did Husain Haqqani do it?

Of course, beyond a shadow of doubt. He did pass on a memorandum to Mansoor Ijaz, seeking his help in saving his boss’s government. It is not a simple case of one man’s word against the other. Mansoor Ijaz has already provided enough documentary evidence from his Blackberry to prove it.

How were the beans spilled?

Haqqani and Ijaz, as professionals in tricks, were to keep the secret only to themselves. By talking one-to-one with Zardari on one side and Mansoor Ijaz on the other, Haqqani ensured complete secrecy. It might well have remained secret.

But human frailty upset the plan. Days before his retirement as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen spoke harshly against our army in his testimony before the U.S. Senate. May be he was disappointed on not succeeding in Afghanistan, or may be it was his pent-up frustration over years on not being able to get our army do his bidding every time. (In an interview some time ago with the French news agency, Agence France Presse (AFP), he said Gen. Kayani could stop the terrorists if he wanted to, and then added ruefully, “I don’t know whether he will do it or not.”)

There was an outrage against Mullen in our media, though the U.S. government played down his statement, even disassociated itself from what he had said. Mullen was enraged, believing that ISI was behind it.

Since Mullen had helped Ijaz in establishing his credibility with Haqqani, he approached him for a quid pro quo. Ijaz agreed and wrote the article for the op-ed (opposite editorial) page of The Financial Times, hoping that it would discredit our army for wilting under American pressure and not taking over. The secret that was deep in his heart came out, to Haqqani’s hard luck. Ijaz himself justified the article in his interview with Sana Bucha (“Lekin!” Geo News, Nov. 14) as a counterattack to criticism against Mullen.

Haqqani must have known much about Mansoor Ijaz, such as his conservative (rightist) leanings and his links with the Pentagon (that he needs for his high-flying diplomatic freelancing). However, he did not know that Ijaz also believes in exchanging favors.

How did Haqqani try to save his skin?

The disclosure of his approach to Ijaz was a disaster for Haqqani. He thought denial would be the best way out. So, he himself contradicted Ijaz, asked the spokesman of the President and the Foreign Office to do the same. They obliged him but it was not enough for him. A contradiction from the other side was also necessary. So, he succeeded in persuading the former spokesman of Mullen to issue a carefully crafted denial. Enraged, Ijaz hit back with a long rejoinder. In fact, he went so far as to show the entire content of his Blackberry to a high official (probably of ISI) and even offered, in his interview with Sana Bucha, to appear before a Parliamentary committee or a court. Haqqani was now in a very thick soup.

Why did Haqqani approach Mullen in the first place?

As an ambassador, Haqqani should have approached the U.S. State Department for help. He could even meet Hillary Clinton. But this channel in his view could not be very productive. A warning from the Pentagon to the army would be more effective. However, he could not meet Mullen directly under the diplomatic rules. Media savvy that he is, he also wanted deniability in case something went wrong. (A message sent through an intermediary could be easily denied if ever the need arose.) Moreover, Mullen could convey the warning to Kayani in normal conversation during one of their frequent meetings, without raising any suspicion that Zardari was behind it.

Politicians with no deep roots in the masses and no confidence in their ability to govern seek help from the outside. Haqqani knew that in September 1999, the Sharif brothers became panicky and sought American help against a possible coup that they feared. Shehbaz rushed to Washington and got a strong statement issued by the State Department in favor of his brother’s government but ultimately to no avail.

In fact, Musharraf had no plan to topple Nawaz government and would not have done anything against it if the Prime Minister had not tried to remove him in a clumsy attempt that was also illegal. (Under the Army Act, no action can be taken against an officer, even a lieutenant, while he is abroad. Secondly, the army chief could not be removed unless the Defense Secretary issued a notification about it (which never happened); there was no validity to even written orders of the Prime Minister that would-be army chief, Lt Gen. Ziauddin Butt, has been showing around.

Who asked Haqqani to do it?

It is the father of all questions. Najam Sethi (“Aapis ki bat,” Geo News, Nov. 15) did a clever spin job. He implied that the army had arranged the Ijaz article, conveniently ignoring the fact that it had nothing to gain. Kayani, like Musharraf, never planned to take over. So, a warning from Mullen, even if given, did not matter. Rather, the article would give the impression that the army did want to take over but held back under an American threat.

Najam also gave an impression that Haqqani might not be guilty, only the army considered him so. He also stopped short of saying that Zardari had asked Haqqani to do it, as if Gilani or somebody else might have done it. Zardari would have been much better off if he had Najam as his official spin doctor.

Who told Zardari about a possible coup?

Good question. Our rulers are very credulous when it comes to a threat to their power. Anybody can make them panicky with a rumor of a coup, however wild. It happened with Nawaz Sharif, when some cronies told him about the possibility of a coup after the Kargil (even though the army had no such intention). No wonder, he sent his brother hastily to the U.S. to prevent it.

The same must have happened with Zardari. Somebody, who had his ear, wanted to convince him of his loyalty and also of his being very informed, told him that he would be the fall guy after the U.S. action in Abbottabad. He could be somebody Zardari trusted very much but was fed false information. Somebody in intelligence? Some journalist, who wanted to get close to the President? Time will tell.

How will it end?

Najam Sethi says that the crisis will end with the sacking or resignation of Husain Haqqani and appointment of a National Security Advisor on the recommendation of the army. It may not be that simple. The army is eyeball to eyeball with Zardari, and according to Ijazul Haq, “On the basis of my information and observation, it is a case of who moves first.”

Azizi of the popular program, “Hasb-i-Haal” (Dunya News), disclosed recently that Zardari has asked Adiala Jail authorities to keep his belongings in the room that he had occupied while there. “I may have to live there again.” The statement has not been contradicted.

According to a media report, Zardari once told a visitor, “If I make America angry, I lose this (pointing to his chair.) If the army gets angry, this will happen.” He moved his open palm across his neck.