روشنی طبع، تو بر من بلا شدی اے
This Farsi line applies aptly to Husain Haqqani, now that his brilliance has landed him in the worst debacle of his career.
The fiasco raised many questions, some still unanswered, some not fully answered. Let us try to find out what it was all about and also put available facts in perspective.
Did Husain Haqqani do it?
Of course, beyond a shadow of doubt. He did pass on a memorandum to Mansoor Ijaz, seeking his help in saving his boss’s government. It is not a simple case of one man’s word against the other. Mansoor Ijaz has already provided enough documentary evidence from his Blackberry to prove it.
How were the beans spilled?
Haqqani and Ijaz, as professionals in tricks, were to keep the secret only to themselves. By talking one-to-one with Zardari on one side and Mansoor Ijaz on the other, Haqqani ensured complete secrecy. It might well have remained secret.
But human frailty upset the plan. Days before his retirement as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen spoke harshly against our army in his testimony before the U.S. Senate. May be he was disappointed on not succeeding in Afghanistan, or may be it was his pent-up frustration over years on not being able to get our army do his bidding every time. (In an interview some time ago with the French news agency, Agence France Presse (AFP), he said Gen. Kayani could stop the terrorists if he wanted to, and then added ruefully, “I don’t know whether he will do it or not.”)
There was an outrage against Mullen in our media, though the U.S. government played down his statement, even disassociated itself from what he had said. Mullen was enraged, believing that ISI was behind it.
Since Mullen had helped Ijaz in establishing his credibility with Haqqani, he approached him for a quid pro quo. Ijaz agreed and wrote the article for the op-ed (opposite editorial) page of The Financial Times, hoping that it would discredit our army for wilting under American pressure and not taking over. The secret that was deep in his heart came out, to Haqqani’s hard luck. Ijaz himself justified the article in his interview with Sana Bucha (“Lekin!” Geo News, Nov. 14) as a counterattack to criticism against Mullen.
Haqqani must have known much about Mansoor Ijaz, such as his conservative (rightist) leanings and his links with the Pentagon (that he needs for his high-flying diplomatic freelancing). However, he did not know that Ijaz also believes in exchanging favors.
How did Haqqani try to save his skin?
The disclosure of his approach to Ijaz was a disaster for Haqqani. He thought denial would be the best way out. So, he himself contradicted Ijaz, asked the spokesman of the President and the Foreign Office to do the same. They obliged him but it was not enough for him. A contradiction from the other side was also necessary. So, he succeeded in persuading the former spokesman of Mullen to issue a carefully crafted denial. Enraged, Ijaz hit back with a long rejoinder. In fact, he went so far as to show the entire content of his Blackberry to a high official (probably of ISI) and even offered, in his interview with Sana Bucha, to appear before a Parliamentary committee or a court. Haqqani was now in a very thick soup.
Why did Haqqani approach Mullen in the first place?
As an ambassador, Haqqani should have approached the U.S. State Department for help. He could even meet Hillary Clinton. But this channel in his view could not be very productive. A warning from the Pentagon to the army would be more effective. However, he could not meet Mullen directly under the diplomatic rules. Media savvy that he is, he also wanted deniability in case something went wrong. (A message sent through an intermediary could be easily denied if ever the need arose.) Moreover, Mullen could convey the warning to Kayani in normal conversation during one of their frequent meetings, without raising any suspicion that Zardari was behind it.
Politicians with no deep roots in the masses and no confidence in their ability to govern seek help from the outside. Haqqani knew that in September 1999, the Sharif brothers became panicky and sought American help against a possible coup that they feared. Shehbaz rushed to Washington and got a strong statement issued by the State Department in favor of his brother’s government but ultimately to no avail.
In fact, Musharraf had no plan to topple Nawaz government and would not have done anything against it if the Prime Minister had not tried to remove him in a clumsy attempt that was also illegal. (Under the Army Act, no action can be taken against an officer, even a lieutenant, while he is abroad. Secondly, the army chief could not be removed unless the Defense Secretary issued a notification about it (which never happened); there was no validity to even written orders of the Prime Minister that would-be army chief, Lt Gen. Ziauddin Butt, has been showing around.
Who asked Haqqani to do it?
It is the father of all questions. Najam Sethi (“Aapis ki bat,” Geo News, Nov. 15) did a clever spin job. He implied that the army had arranged the Ijaz article, conveniently ignoring the fact that it had nothing to gain. Kayani, like Musharraf, never planned to take over. So, a warning from Mullen, even if given, did not matter. Rather, the article would give the impression that the army did want to take over but held back under an American threat.
Najam also gave an impression that Haqqani might not be guilty, only the army considered him so. He also stopped short of saying that Zardari had asked Haqqani to do it, as if Gilani or somebody else might have done it. Zardari would have been much better off if he had Najam as his official spin doctor.
Who told Zardari about a possible coup?
Good question. Our rulers are very credulous when it comes to a threat to their power. Anybody can make them panicky with a rumor of a coup, however wild. It happened with Nawaz Sharif, when some cronies told him about the possibility of a coup after the Kargil (even though the army had no such intention). No wonder, he sent his brother hastily to the U.S. to prevent it.
The same must have happened with Zardari. Somebody, who had his ear, wanted to convince him of his loyalty and also of his being very informed, told him that he would be the fall guy after the U.S. action in Abbottabad. He could be somebody Zardari trusted very much but was fed false information. Somebody in intelligence? Some journalist, who wanted to get close to the President? Time will tell.
How will it end?
Najam Sethi says that the crisis will end with the sacking or resignation of Husain Haqqani and appointment of a National Security Advisor on the recommendation of the army. It may not be that simple. The army is eyeball to eyeball with Zardari, and according to Ijazul Haq, “On the basis of my information and observation, it is a case of who moves first.”
Azizi of the popular program, “Hasb-i-Haal” (Dunya News), disclosed recently that Zardari has asked Adiala Jail authorities to keep his belongings in the room that he had occupied while there. “I may have to live there again.” The statement has not been contradicted.
According to a media report, Zardari once told a visitor, “If I make America angry, I lose this (pointing to his chair.) If the army gets angry, this will happen.” He moved his open palm across his neck.
No comments:
Post a Comment