Conspiracies are intriguing and fascinating. The Memo Scandal, involving Husain Haqqani and others, is no different. Some of its secrets are already known, while others may be on the way. In my previous post ( (see article below), I raised some questions. Here are some more.
Why was the memo written and delivered in the first place?
According to Mansoor Ijaz, Haqqani claimed that the government feared a military coup. However, now it appears that it was the other way round. After the Abbottabad attack, the army preferred to claim that it had been taken by surprise. In view of its vulnerability due to public outrage, somebody in the Zardari coterie had the brilliant idea that the present army leadership should be replaced with pliable one. The idea got a favorable hearing.
However, it was not forgotten what had happened to Nawaz Sharif, who made a clumsy attempt to remove the army chief with disastrous consequences. So, it was decided to get the American support before replacing top generals.
The thrust of the charge against Haqqani is given in Mansoor’s article in Newsweek (http://www.thedailybeast.com/
“Zardari and Haqqani both knew the U.S. was going to launch a stealth mission to eliminate bin Laden that would violate Pakistan’s sovereignty. They may have even given advance consent after CIA operations on the ground in Pakistan pinpointed the Saudi fugitive’s location. The unilateral U.S. action, they might have surmised, would result in a nation blaming its armed forces and intelligence services for culpability in harboring bin Laden for so many years. They planned to use the Pakistani public’s hue and cry to force the resignations of Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and intelligence chief Gen. Shuja Pasha. Pliable replacements would have been appointed.”
Haqqani has not much to worry about a conviction if Zardari is still the President. After all, there will be nothing to stop Zardari from pardoning Haqqani promptly. If Rehman Malik can survive despite court judgments, there is no reason why Haqqani should fare worse.
Persons close to Zardari, in Islamabad and Washington, conceived, wrote and finished the memo, with his approval. Then it was delivered to the Pentagon through Mansoor.
Why did the memo surface now?
Both Haqqani and Ijaz would have kept the memo secret forever, whether or not it led to any action by the U.S. How come it was disclosed only after four months? Lt Gen Hameed Gul believes that the Pentagon made the disclosure after the government had failed to carry out the promises made in the memorandum even in over four months. (That means the Pentagon did give the warning to the army top brass that Zardari coterie wanted and then waited for the fulfillment of the promises in the memo.)
There is another possibility. The Pentagon did not expect a pliable government to emerge after the elections because parties of both Zardari and Nawaz Sharif were losing popularity. Imran Khan could break into vote banks of both PPP and Nawaz League. The more time he has, the more popularity he will gain. Even if he did not get majority in election, he could still end up as the head of a coalition. That will make life quite difficult for the U.S. operations in Afghanistan.
The urgent question for the Pentagon was: How to stop Imran Khan? The best option would be to get rid of the PPP government now, help install an interim government to revive economy and clear the mess, and get the elections postponed indefinitely. Then it will be comfortable army-to-army dealings. Since top Pentagon generals knew the existence of the Haqqani memo, one of them asked Ijaz to disclose it. It was to be a booby trap. No wonder, the Zardari regime is teetering on the verge of collapse.
Could Haqqani nip the scandal in the bed?
He could. The day Mansoor’s article appeared in The Financial Times, Haqqani could have concluded that Zardari’s game was up. The Pentagon did convey the warning to the army in May but was now angry with Zardari for failing to carry out the remaining promises in his memo.
That should have been enough for Haqqani to resign immediately, claiming that he was exhausted by grueling diplomacy and wanted to go back to his “professory” (as we say in Urdu). To be on the safe side, he could also seek political asylum. To his misfortune, Haqqani dragged his feet and finally had to leave Washington kicking and screaming to face the music in Islamabad.
As it happens often with ambitious persons, arrogance makes them ignore the ground realities. Haqqani was not willing to call it quits so easily. With Zardari at his back and many influential friends in the U.S., he was sure he could survive easily. However, his defense against Ijaz’s onslaught was only denial. It was like defending oneself with a plastic shield against a rocket launcher. So, he landed himself soon in a very hot soup, with his hope dashed of becoming the National Security Advisor and, with luck, even something much higher. Now he wonders whether it will be his neck or that of his “boss” -- or both.
What can Haqqani do now?
There was for some time a talk of compromise (muk muka مک مکا in plain words), to end the episode after getting Haqqani’s resignation. However, the action by Supreme Court on the Haqqani scandal has made it impossible.
بات نکلی ھے تو دور تلک جاءے گی
Now Haqqani has two options: Stick with Zadari or betray him. If he believes that Zardari will survive the crisis, he may decide to remain faithful to him. If, in his view, Zardari may be forced out even without impeachment or conviction (see below), Haqqani may become an approver against his “boss.”
What are the prospects for Zardari’s survival? His impeachment may be difficult, as he may use all his skills and means to win over most MNAs. The motion to impeach Pervez Musharraf seemed likely to succeed, as it had support from both the U.S. and the army. If the same support is available, Zardari may be impeached. However, it will be simply removal as President. He will still be a force to reckon with, being the head of his party.
If Zardari is prosecuted, his prospects will be better than impeachment. He did not allow any case against him to reach a conclusion despite years of trial. He will work harder to do the same indefinitely, using all the tricks of legal profession.
Haqqani might be tried not under Article 6 of the Constitutionbut, according to Justice Tariq Mahmood, under Section 121 of the Pakistan Penal Code, viz., “Whoever wages war against Pakistan, or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.”
How will it all end?
A lot of noise may be created for months by investigation, court trial, impeachment motion, discussions, agitations, all the words poured out in the paper and electronic media but the process may well drag into Zardari’s final months in office. He is not very keen for another term for him and his party because he and his cronies have grabbed all they wanted, destroying all they could in the process. So, he will not be unhappy if he leaves in 2013 with a guard of honor.
However, what most people fear may well happen, as long as Zardari is in Sadar Mahal صدر محل (President House). In the meantime, he may do much worse than he had promised the U.S. in his memo to Admiral Mike Mullen. So, the Establishment may not be willing to allow status quo to continue. It also has to consider abysmal conditions in the country: economic disaster, massive corruption, gross misgovernance, high inflation, severe crime wave, energy crisis, political chaos, subservience to foreign interests. The security of the state and vital national interests are far more important than any possible hostile reaction from politicians, media and Supreme Court. (The U.S. and the so-called “international community” may soon reconcile with fait accompli, even if it is not happy.) So, don’t be surprised if you learn one fine morning that the 111 Brigade is in action.
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